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Background: Public-private collaborations are increasingly being utilized to universalize health care. In Malawi, the
Ministry of Health contracts selected health facilities owned by the main faith-based provider, the Christian Health
Association of Malawi (CHAM), to deliver care at no fee to the most vulnerable and underserved populations in the
country through Service Level Agreements (SLAs). This study examined the features of SLAs and their effectiveness
in expanding universal coverage. The study involved a policy analysis focusing on key stakeholders around SLAs as
well as a case study approach to analyse how design and implementation of SLAs affect efficiency, equity and
sustainability of services delivered by SLAs.
Methods: The study employed both qualitative and quantitative research methods to address the research
questions and was conducted in five CHAM health facilities: Mulanje Mission, Holy Family, and Mtengowanthenga
Hospitals, and Mabiri and Nkope Health Centres. National and district level decision makers were interviewed while
providers and clients associated with the health facilities were surveyed on their experiences. A total of 155 clients
from an expected 175 were recruited in the study.
Results: The study findings revealed key aspects of how SLAs were operating, the extent to which their objectives
were being attained and why. In general, the findings demonstrated that SLAs had the potential to improve health
and universal health care coverage, particularly for the vulnerable and underserved populations. However, the
findings show that the performance of SLAs in Malawi were affected by various factors including lack of clear
guidelines, non-revised prices, late payment of bills, lack of transparency, poor communication, inadequate human
and material resources, and lack of systems to monitor performance of SLAs, amongst others.
Conclusions: There was strong consensus and shared interest between the government and CHAM regarding
SLAs. It was clear that free services provided by SLAs had a great impact on the impoverished locals that used the
facilities. However, lack of supporting systems, inadequate infrastructure and shortage of health care providers
affected SLA performance. The paper provides recommendations to policy makers for the replication and
strengthening of SLA implementation in the roll-out of universalization policy.
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Since 2004, the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Malawi has
subsidized health facilities owned by the main faith-
based provider, the Christian Health Association of
Malawi (CHAM), to deliver care at no fee to the most
vulnerable and underserved populations in the form of
Service Level Agreements (SLAs). SLAs are a national
policy priority, implemented (in the context of decentral-
ization) at the district level, aiming at ensuring universal
financial risk protection with a primary focus on maternal
and neonatal interventions. This study examined the
effectiveness of the SLA contracting arrangements and
the reasons for this in terms of SLA design and the
relationship between the government and CHAM in
Malawi.
The basic health indicators in Malawi are amongst
the worst globally. For instance, HIV/AIDS prevalence
stands at 11% amongst adults, maternal mortality ratio
is 675/100,000 and under-five mortality is 112/1,000
[1]. In order to address these and other health chal-
lenges, the Government of Malawi together with devel-
opment partners have been implementing reforms aimed
at improving efficiency and equity in the delivery of health
care. To reduce the high burden of disease in Malawi,
the MoH and its collaborating partners developed a six
year Joint Program of Work 2004–2010 as a strategic
means to deliver the Essential Health Package (EHP)
and other interventions aimed at improving the health
care delivery system [2]. The EHP is a combination of
high impact and cost-effective health care interven-
tions. The Malawi EHP has thirteen components and it
focuses on the major causes of morbidity and mortality,
particularly those affecting vulnerable populations. The
Joint Program of Work was succeeded by the Health
Sector Strategic Plan (2011–2016) whose overall goal
is to improve the quality of life of all the people of
Malawi [2]. The EHP is delivered free of charge to all
Malawians by the public health sector. CHAM health
facilities also deliver selected EHP services free to
women and children under five. CHAM is an umbrella
organization of most Christian-church owned health
facilities; it is a very large player in the national health sec-
tor and oversees approximately 35% of all health centres
in Malawi.
The 2011 Malawi Demographic and Health Survey
showed that maternal mortality, as well as infant and
child mortality, decreased only modestly since the last
survey in 2004. There are many persistent challenges in
the health sector, such as inadequate financing, short-
age of drugs, health planning, drug procurement, and a
lack of monitoring and evaluation [2,3]. Although MoH
finances the purchase of some drugs and all local
staffing costs in CHAM facilities, CHAM charges fees
to cover other drugs and operating expenses. Further,CHAM facilities tend to be located in the very poorest
areas of Malawi, and thus their fees policy represents a
financial barrier to access to those living in their catch-
ment areas; such fees have reduced access to care and
impoverished households [4]. Consequently, MoH en-
couraged District Health Offices (DHOs) to establish
SLAs for the removal of user fees in CHAM. By 2011,
75 out of approximately 172 CHAM facilities were cov-
ered by SLAs and the initial SLAs had been in operation
for more than 5 years.
Public health care financing in Malawi comes largely
from government taxes as well as from contributions by
donors to the health budget via direct budgetary support
to the Ministry of Finance or through the health sector
wide approach. Private financing is the second major
source of health financing in Malawi. A good proportion
of the population is not covered by a public facility and
such communities have to make an out-of-pocket pay-
ment for use of health services at the for-profit health
facilities. Private health insurance is not well developed,
largely due to state provision and financing of health
services, and to high levels of poverty.
The use of contracting with non-state providers has
been highlighted in the literature as potentially very
effective in improving the quality and coverage of care,
but where further research is required [5,6]. Contracting
has been associated with increased technical efficiency
through making health facilities claimants on revenues
or exposing them to competitive pressures [6]. Such
reforms may also have pragmatic advantages – including
the ability to bypass overly bureaucratic government
procedures and overcome absorptive capacity constraints
in the scale up of services [5]. Nevertheless, contracts are
prone to problems associated with agency and transaction
costs. Where the objectives of the contracting parties
do not align there are problems with guaranteeing that
the agent works in the interests of the principal as well
as issues with transparency, causing ‘information asym-
metry’; these conflicting objectives will lead the agent
to behave as a ‘moral hazard’, indulging in actions for
its own benefit and not those of the principal. The
principal is thus forced to incur costs either in relation
to monitoring the agent’s actions or in terms of formu-
lating a contract to produce sufficient incentives for
‘good’ agent behaviour [7]. In addition, the resources
consumed to develop, evaluate and renegotiate contracts
themselves may be significant [5]. Such factors may
well undermine the efficiency of contracting. Further,
the dynamic of repeated contracts allows parties to be-
come familiarised and to develop a relationship and a
reputation, and thus adjust their actions [8]; this may
enhance the contracting relationship but it may also
reveal true intentions and actions and cause difficulties
in the contracting process. Hence, while there may be
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substantial risks.
The Taskforce for Health Systems Research identified
non-state sector research as a priority research topic in
its 2005 report. The Alliance for Health Policy and
Systems Research has also made the ‘Role of the Non-
State Sector in Health Care Provision’ one of its three
priority themes [9]. In particular, there is a need for
improved knowledge in a number of areas, including
the dynamics of the purchaser and provider relationship
[6]; systems effects and equity implications [9]; the cap-
acity of resource-constrained governments to fulfil the
purchaser role; and how relationships with providers
evolve over time [6]. The Alliance for Health Policy and
Systems Research call for proposals was on “assessing
efforts towards universal financial risk protection in
low- and middle-income countries”. This study assesses
the efforts made by the Government of Malawi focusing
on case studies.
The objectives of the study are to examine the pur-
chaser-provider relation dynamics, where the purchaser
is the government and the provider is non-state, as-
sessing the effects of this relationship on care provision
and access on the part of the beneficiary. In particular,
this study aims to examine the effectiveness of SLAs,
their contractual arrangements in terms of design of the
agreements, and the relationship between the govern-
ment and CHAM in Malawi. The specific objectives of
this study are to: i) understand the governance structures,
sectoral context and inter-sectoral dynamics, within which
SLAs have emerged as a policy reform and to identify any
obstacles to their adoption; and ii) evaluate the efficiency,
effectiveness, equity and sustainability of SLAs aiming
to improve the national roll-out policy, and in particu-
lar to assess how provider payment mechanisms within
SLAs have impacted on coverage and user satisfaction.
Research questions
The study was guided by the following research ques-
tions: What are the factors that have constrained or
supported contracting out of government services to
CHAM facilities in Malawi? What determined the choice
of provider payment mechanisms in SLA development?
How has the design of the SLA, and in particular the
choice of provider payment mechanism, affected the effi-
ciency and equity of purchasing services, the financial
accessibility of households and the sustainability of the
reform? What are the lessons in terms of designing and
managing contracting out of services to faith-based or-
ganizations to further universal coverage?
Methods
This study employed a mixed methods approach, whereby
both quantitative and qualitative data were used. Itconsisted of two strands. The first was a policy analysis
focusing on the key stakeholders around SLAs, their
views, communication and interactions. The second
component involved case studies to analyse how SLA
design and implementation affected their efficiency,
equity and sustainability.
Sources of data
The study recruited its participants from national, dis-
trict and local levels: policy and decision makers who
were involved at the establishment of SLAs, DHO and
CHAM Health Facility Management teams, health care
providers and clients. The study aimed to interview a
maximum of 20 participants (10 at central, and 2 at each
case study facility). A total of 155 clients from the
expected 175 who visited the health care facilities for
maternal and child health were recruited in exit interviews.
Nine focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted.
The FGDs comprised available community members sur-
rounding each participating facility. Quantitative data were
captured from the Health Management Information
System (HMIS). Data collectors collected the data using
a checklist.
Policy analysis
Key documents and communications in the form of mi-
nutes and memos were reviewed and analysed to under-
stand the context and reform development within which
SLAs emerged. The relationship between government and
CHAM was investigated using semi-structured interviews,
policy analysis tools and techniques around both the
design and implementation of the agreement [10].
Questionnaire and semi-structured interviews
The questionnaire administered to health care providers
used a mixture of Likert scales and closed and open-ended
questions. Quantitative data from the questionnaires was
analysed using excel. Data from questions and interviews
were analysed manually using a thematic content analysis.
A coding tree, which was agreed upon by the research
team, was developed before data collection. Following data
collection and transcription, coding was done by one
member of the study team. The coded data was grouped
into categories and themes. After coding, the data was
independently checked by another member of the study
team to ensure validity.
Semi-structured interviews with key personnel both
at MoH and CHAM central and district levels, were
conducted in English. Participants were purposefully
sampled through the National Steering Committee on
SLAs. The Committee was specifically established to
guide the study and was composed of members from the
MoH, CHAM and the College of Medicine who were
selected according to their involvement and knowledge
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and CHAM facility managers were interviewed to explore
SLA incentives and behaviour encouragement activities.
The frontline interviews were designed to supplement
information collected from HMIS, annual reports and
client exit interviews. The findings corroborated the
documents reviewed.
Exit interviews
The client exit interviews were administered to clients
who were randomly recruited after they had received
health care services at each case study facility. Data on
the care process were collected with attention to cost
barriers, non-cost barriers and perception of clients on
the service provided. The study aimed to interview a
maximum of 35 clients per facility. However, due to low
number of clients at some facilities, the number of
people interviewed was lower. A total of 155 clients,
from an expected 175, who visited the health care facil-
ities for maternal and child health were recruited in the
interview. The interviews were conducted using an
interview guide and administered in the local language
of Chichewa.
Focus group discussions (FGDs)
FGDs were conducted with community members near-
est to the participating facilities. The FGDs comprised
of women only because men felt women were more
suitable given that they were the ones who accessed the
services. The number of participants per group varied
from five to eight. Data from FGDs complemented that
from exit interviews, providing information on access
and perceived effectiveness. Data from FGDs were also
analysed manually using a thematic content analysis fol-
lowing the same process as that of the semi-structured
interviews.
Health Management Information System (HMIS)
HMIS data was collected at the facility level, before and
after the removal of fees and the introduction of SLAs.
The aim was to solicit data on patterns of utilization and
was used to assess the interventions covered by SLA at
each facility. Due to the limited capacity of staff, it was
not possible to access the HMIS data in some facilities.
Information from HMIS was collated with the corre-
sponding invoices to compare the cost of provision
being passed on to the DHO for reimbursement.
SLA case studies
Case studies are a useful approach when complex phe-
nomena are under study and the richness of material is
more important to understand than breadth of scope
[11]. Upon discussion with the National Steering Com-
mittee, five case studies in five different health facilitieswere recommended, leading to the modification of the
criteria and selection of the facilities in liaison with
CHAM. The facilities selected were:
Mtengowanthenga Hospital, Dowa District (Central
region). It was the first institution to sign an SLA in 2004
covering maternal health but the contract was later revised
to include child health. It caters for a catchment area
population of 56,000.
Mulanje Mission Hospital, Mulanje District (Southern
region). Located 10 km from Mulanje District Hospital.
Hence, the catchment areas of the two hospitals overlap.
The hospital signed an SLA in 2005, which covers ma-
ternal and child health services.
Holy Family Hospital, Phalombe District (Southern
region). It signed the SLA in 2006 and is located in a
rural area. The Holy Family SLA is distinct in that the
hospital acts as a district hospital and is therefore used
as a referral facility. It covers all elements of the EHP
unlike other SLAs that cover only one or two elements.
Mabiri Health Centre, Mzimba District (Northern re-
gion). It is located in a very remote area where there is
no government facility nearby. It signed an SLA in 2006
and covers both maternal and child health services.
Nkope Health Centre, Mangochi District (Southern
region). The SLA in Nkope was signed in 2006 being one
of the newest and covers maternal and child health.
The key characteristics for each case study choice relate
to reviewing the length of the contractual relationship
between the DHOs and CHAM facilities and how the
presence of competition might affect this interaction.
Results
Governance structures, sectoral context and inter-sectoral
dynamics within which SLAs emerged
The results of the semi-structured interviews with cen-
tral and facility level managers revealed the absence of
explicit and documented policies to guide the implemen-
tation of SLAs. Through these interviews, a policy ana-
lysis was performed to evaluate the relationship between
government and CHAM, and how this affected SLAs’
design and implementation. In relation to governance,
the interviews revealed that the MoH and the CHAM
Secretariat are involved in signing a memorandum of
understanding at the policy level while SLAs are admin-
istered, through a decentralized structure, at the district
level with the DHO taking charge of the implementation
process. The MoH delegates SLA implementation to the
relevant DHOs who are responsible for providing funds
for SLA services and salary costs of health workers. The
DHO procures essential drugs, equipment, medical sup-
plies, transport for referrals and other resources.
The results further revealed that the government,
through the MoH, initiated the reform engaging CHAM

















































Figure 1 Trend of the paediatric visits in Mtengowanthenga
health facility.
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political, economic and social contexts or identification
of the necessary supporting structures and systems re-
quired for its effective and efficient implementation.
Furthermore, it was reported that there are no clear pro-
cedures, communication channels, monitoring and evalu-
ation systems to guide and support the implementation
of SLAs. Additionally, communication was reported to
be often informal and sometimes infrequent. It was also
reported through facility level interviews that DHO and
CHAM facility management, other civil societies (local
and international NGOs) and health care providers were
not consulted on the initiated reform. They were also
not oriented on their expected roles.
Reasons for introducing SLAs between the government
and CHAM in Malawi
Semi-structured interviews with central level and facility
level managers revealed that SLAs were required, through
a common interest between the government and CHAM,
to improve access, equity and quality of maternal and
neonatal services with the ultimate aim of reducing ma-
ternal and neonatal mortality and morbidity; this was
also supported by the Development Partners. It was fur-
ther reported that the common motivation for the SLA
partnerships focused on the need to increase coverage
and affordability in order to improve health and univer-
sal access to health care by the poor. Such overlapping
interests are an important help to effective contracting
and lower the risk of a moral hazard.
Payment mechanisms within SLAs
Through central and facility level semi-structured inter-
views it was found that payment mechanisms within
SLAs are agreed upon through a reimbursement system
and billing is based on the cost of services. There were
conflicting views on whether SLAs had guidelines for
the billing prices of services; whilst the price list was
reported to be available, no guidelines were provided
alongside them. MoH, in consultation with the CHAM
Secretariat, drew up the original price list that was
communicated to DHOs and CHAM facilities. Billing
for care provided was, as noted, based on the cost of
services following these agreed billing prices and the
stated guidelines. There was a universal agreement among
facility level managers of frequently “delayed cash transfers
from the [state] treasury to the DHO”, with consequent
delayed payments to CHAM facilities.
Efficiency, effectiveness, equity and sustainability of SLAs
in Malawi
There was unanimous agreement among participants
involved in central and facility level semi-structured in-
terviews and FDGs that SLAs were “a good initiative”and that they had helped overcome geographical barriers,
increase coverage of health care services, improve health
and universal access to health care for the targeted poor,
and improve equity of access to health care services. As
one health care provider at a CHAM facility mentioned:
“SLAs are good, we are serving poor people. The
number of hospital visits has increased. Because of the
SLA, people are willing to come because the
government is going to pay, so we are saving lives. …
previously, we were having more maternal deaths
because of the delay in coming to the hospital, they
were afraid to come, but with this SLA, it is reducing
the maternal deaths. So people are coming earlier to
the hospital and even to the antenatal clinic the
number of people visiting has increased”.
(Health care provider).
Improvements in the quality of health services over
time was also recognized as a success of SLAs by pa-
tients through exit interviews. Findings from the client
exit survey showed that clients used the services more
after SLA implementation because the services were
generally free; “not having to pay” had a great impact
on the local service users and most of them reported
satisfaction with the quality of care. Although the qual-
ity of data from HMIS was poor, it was still possible to
spot the increase in number of children and women
utilizing health care services due to the introduction of
SLA services. In the Mtengowanthenga health facility
the number of paediatric visits increased by approxi-
mately 600% from 2008 to 2010 and the number of de-
liveries increased by approximately 400% from 2004 to

















































Figure 2 Trend of the deliveries in Mtengowanthenga
health facility.
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Through FGDs and semi-structured interviews with fa-
cility level managers, a lack of clear systems, guidelines,
policies, procedures, and role clarification among stake-
holders was reported to have negatively affected SLA
performance. The hasty decision to implement SLAs
was also reported as an obstacle to allowing adequate
and effective preparation for SLA implementation and
this overwhelmed the providers, institutions and stake-
holders. Furthermore, a lack of transparency, dishonesty,
failure to follow guidelines and overcharging of SLA ser-
vices, were also reported to have a negative impact on
the performance of SLAs. As one respondent was quoted
as saying:
“When DHO was doing data verification [at CHAM],
we noticed that some clients did not appear in the
HMIS register, and some clients were males. The
statistics for SLA patients does not change despite
variations in disease epidemiology. Every month the
figures are the same. For example, from January to
December the figures for Malaria cases are more or
less the same despite that in some months the
incidence of Malaria is higher compared to the other
months”. (Health care provider).
The facility level managers also reported that in-
adequate revenues to fund SLAs led to delayed cash
transfers and payments and placed a strain on the rela-
tionship between CHAM facilities and the DHOs. Fur-
thermore, it was reported that SLA billings do not include
the cost of overhead costs (utilities), such as electricity,
water, fuel and telephone bills; as such, CHAM depends
on other charges such as consultation fees to cover up the
overhead costs. The cost of overheads and consultationfees therefore emerged as a prohibiting factor to effective
functioning of SLAs. As one respondent indicated:
“…this still remains a paying institution though [it] is
under SLA…overhead costs are not included in the
SLA bills. The government is not giving us fuel for
vehicles and is not paying electricity for us, the
government does not pay for our phones, maintenance
of structures, now how do we sustain those activities if
we only get drugs. You see now, though we are paid,
we appreciate we are paid. We still need to maintain
the institution. Apart from giving the medication to
the patients, the other operations have to move”.
(CHAM facility manager).
Furthermore, the facility level managers reported that
the lack of a validation system in CHAM’s health records
and documentation contributed to deterring efficiency,
which was made worse by a lack of supervision, breeding
further mistrust between DHOs and CHAM facilities.
This led to the DHO accumulating debt. Subsequently
SLAs were cancelled and in many cases this was report-
edly due to non-payment of bills. Where facility HMIS
data exist, they show that SLA cancellation resulted in
reduced utilisation of services. In March 2008, an SLA
was put in place to provide paediatric care in Mtengo-
wanthenga health facility and, in September 2010, it
was decommissioned. HMIS data showed that SLA en-
actment prompted a significant increase in the use of
paediatric services (more than a 600% increase) from
2008 and the use of the services dropped back to the
original level following this decommissioning in 2010
(Figure 1). Similarly, the number of deliveries reported
by HMIS, in the Mtengowanthenga facility steadily in-
creased over the last seven years following SLA imple-
mentation for delivery service (2004) while they declined
when the SLA was decommissioned in 2010 (Figure 2).
Rising costs of services were also identified to be an
important factor. HMIS data for Mulanje Mission hos-
pital, between 2006 and 2011, shows that there was an
increase of 23% in the utilization of maternal services
and this resulted in a 56% increase in costs for these
services. Apart from the increase in utilisation of SLA
services, other factors were also reported to have in-
fluenced this sharp rise in costs. Firstly, the increase
was perversely triggered by the non-revision of the ini-
tial price list, drawn up five years previously. CHAM
facilities reported to have raised their concerns with
DHOs, but, with no tangible response, they felt com-
pelled to revise prices unilaterally. According to the
signed memorandum of understanding, the DHO can-
not pay invoices beyond the prices originally agreed.
This results in accumulation and non-payment of bills
thereby acting as hindrance to provision of SLA forcing
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one respondent mentioned:
“The bill is big and they are failing to pay. The
number of referrals has been cut; we are no longer
accepting referrals. If you go around you will see that
there are no patients in the wards and it’s because of
that. We’ve told them that as long as they cannot
accept to pay us using the bill we’ve used to buy drugs,
then we cannot provide services, or else the hospital is
going to collapse. We have told them that for the mean
time they should not send patients. We are only
receiving paediatric and maternity cases on
humanitarian grounds, but we are even losing more
money”. (CHAM facility manager).
Secondly, the facility level managers reported that
according to the SLA, CHAM facilities were to procure
their drugs from the Central Medical Stores; however,
when the stores could not supply them with drugs,
CHAM facilities ended up buying from private drug
suppliers whose prices are normally expensive com-
pared to Central Medical Store charges. One facility
level manager explained as follows:
“When we are signing the agreement we are supposed
to be collecting drugs from the Central Medical Stores,
now when you go there you find that drugs are not
there, instead we go to private pharmacies to buy the
drugs obviously at a higher price. When billing, we bill
at those higher prices, even though when we were
signing the agreement there was this price list which
we were supposed to adhere to. When paying the bill,
they only pay us based on the old prices which came
in 2006, which are lower…. For example if we buy
drugs at K1,000.00, and when billing if they refer to
the old price list you will find that it is 300 or 400
which is a loss now. When we ask them to pay us the
difference…there is that misunderstanding and we
struggle to get the answer”. (CHAM facility manager).
A substantial increase in workload due to SLA intro-
duction was also identified as a problem affecting the im-
plementation of SLAs. The ‘Front Line Providers’ survey
carried out with the employees demonstrated that they
perceived that “their workload had increased as a result
of the SLA”: the average facility score was 4.3 out of
maximum of 5. The facility level managers reported that
the workload was compromising quality of care because
initially there were no additional resources for the antici-
pated number of clients. One health care provider said:
“With SLA the workload has increased. …we have
limited human resources… with the same number ofstaff we have to take care of twenty or hundred times
of the patients. The workload is too much, the
congestion is too much”. (Health care provider).
A facility level semi-structured interview revealed
that compared to the time when SLAs were introduced,
there is now decreased enthusiasm pertaining to the SLAs
because of delayed payments and review of contracts,
as well as the presence of different unresolved misun-
derstandings between government and CHAM. One re-
spondent shared his observation on this as follows:
“I think the time the SLA idea was being developed
everyone was very happy, motivated and dedicated,
because things started well and were just running
smoothly. Now things are changing, I can say there is
not much enthusiasm pertaining to the SLA’s”.
(Health care provider).
Discussion
There is strong consensus and shared interest between
the government and CHAM regarding SLA and the ex-
tension of universalization. This was very helpful to the
formulation of the contracts and their initial implemen-
tation. Further, it appears that free services provided by
SLAs improved utilization. SLAs helped to overcome
geographical and financial barriers to access antenatal,
maternal and infant care thereby improving equity of
access to health services.
However, the findings show that the performance and
continuation of SLAs in Malawi is being affected by a
lack of supporting processes and structures. The key
concerns are non-revised prices, late payment of bills, a
lack of transparency, poor communication within and
among stakeholders including health care providers, civil
societies and communities, inadequate human and mater-
ial resources and lack of monitoring systems and general
guidelines. The findings of this study reveal that SLAs
were introduced quickly without any prior analysis of
the political, economic and social contexts and without
adequate supporting structures, such as clear policies to
guide implementation and arbitration committees to re-
solve contractual difficulties. All this has created growing
mistrust, moral hazard, and in some cases, the termination
of SLAs. Such results confirm key findings from the inter-
national literature [6,12,13].
This situation raises serious concerns about the effect-
iveness and sustainability of SLAs in Malawi without
remedial action. The lack of documentation, unverified
records, and inadequate monitoring gave the facilities
the freedom to fluctuate their cost figures. In particular,
billing prices for SLA services increased sharply to the
extent that a bill from a single CHAM facility exceeded
the total budget of the DHO. At first sight, the case
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sive than equivalent government provision [12]. Yet, on
closer inspection, a complex picture emerges from the
study and it is not easy to tell what an appropriate level
of funding would be. Many CHAM facilities are in re-
mote areas where unit costs will necessarily be higher.
Where the government had committed to supplying
drugs and this did not happen, CHAM facilities incurred
higher costs as they sourced from private suppliers. In
addition, postponed government payments may have
produced deliberate cost escalation from NGO facilities
to compensate for the delays. Further, the financial effect
of the large increase in the volume of services in some
cases does not seem to have been anticipated. More fun-
damental research is required to highlight better pricing
tariffs for such contracts.
The signing of SLAs did not stop user fees (for mater-
nal, neonatal and infant care) in some cases and some
CHAM facilities continued to raise revenues from pa-
tients for services provided. It is important to highlight
that individual perceptions of a public policy are essen-
tial for evaluating the success or failure of any program
or system [14]. Consequently, the case studies show that
contracting can be effective in improving the quality and
coverage of care [15], as well as improving the health
system’s overall performance, when correct supporting
measures are taken. Due to many challenges with the
availability and quality of data, the study failed to carry
out detailed individual facility analyses of the efficiency
and equity of purchasing for SLAs. The study did not
manage to collect continuous data from all case study
sites. Data was not available due to poor documentation
and record keeping.
On reflection, there were clearly overlapping objec-
tives across the parties in the provision of good free
care but this was not the whole picture. Breaches of
trust occurred on both sides in terms of incidents of
not supplying finances or medicines at the appropriate
time on the government side and not removing user
fees and purchasing costly medicines for care in some
CHAM facilities. The matter of resource availability and
sustainability may have proved more important to each
party than delivering care in particular cases. Further,
the early trust brokered by common objectives seemed
to disintegrate over time as parties learned of each
other’s actions and adjusted their own responses. Such
experiences of contracting reinforce many findings in
the literature. Good information flow between parties
was not established or enabled at the outset, exacerbating
information imbalances and moral hazard. An effective
evaluation system for verifying CHAM’s records was
absent. Such factors may have made it easier for parties
to evade their responsibilities. Further transaction costs
were higher than necessary because of a lack of formalsupport to the SLAs. The Malawian experience high-
lights the importance of providing good support to help
make contracting more effective and of facilitating re-
quired information and resource flows. These results
can provide guidance, lessons and recommendations to
policy makers (MoH, CHAM Secretariat) in replicating
and strengthening the implementation of SLAs in the
roll-out of universalization policy and to other contexts
attempting similar initiatives.
Recommendations
There is a need to review, develop and implement com-
prehensive guidelines with clear time lines, targets, roles
and responsibilities of players at different levels, such as
DHOs, CHAM Secretariat, CHAM facilities and com-
munities. It is important to develop a contracting frame-
work and strengthen the data management system with
indicators for measuring and monitoring performance.
Furthermore, there is a need to establish a simple but ro-
bust financial reporting mechanism to keep costs updated
(including maintenance costs), and to develop clear billing
and payment mechanisms. A trusting relationship between
the contracting parties is essential for effective implemen-
tation of SLAs. Policy makers should make a deliberate
effort to involve civil society at all levels and establish and
strengthen (procedures) processes with regard to resource
allocation, communication, record keeping and reporting.
All stakeholders involved in the SLA implementation
should be consulted on what is possible and what is not, in
terms of the feasibility of the SLA, predictable obstacles
and barriers, as well as strengths.
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